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ABSTRACT
This is an approach to detecting a subset of bots on Twitter, that at best is under-researched. This approach
will be generic enough to be adaptable to most, if not all social networks. The subset of bots this focuses on are
those that can evade most, if not all current detection methods. This is simply because they have little to no
information associated with them that can be analyzed to make a determination. Although any account on any
social media site inherently has information associated with it, it is very easy to blend in with the majority of
users who are simply lurkers - those who only consume content, but do not contribute. How can you determine
if an account is a bot if they dont do anything? By the time they act, it will be too late to detect. The only
solution would be a real time, or near real-time, detection algorithm
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1. INTRODUCTION
Twitter is a microblogging social media website. It stands out from its competitors, such as Facebook and
LinkedIn by the fact that it limits posts or tweets (text-based message) to only 140 characters. Twitter is
also unique in that relationships can be directed, whereas on sites such as Facebook most relationships are bi-
directional. This is made possible due to the way that Twitter allows relationships between users to be created.
Twitter is one of the largest websites in the world, and as of the time of this writing, it is ranked the 10th
most popular site globally, as reported by Alexa [1]. Similarly, it is ranked as the 8th most popular site in the
United States. Twitter boasts having 320 million monthly active users, and over 1 billion unique monthly visits.
Furthermore, the company claims that an astounding 500 million tweets are sent every day [2].
In this paper we present a novel approach to detecting bots on twitter in near real-time. Our approach
comprises of computationally simple comparisons and calculations, as opposed to the all too common machine
learning approach to this problem, or non real-time approaches that involve network analysis which is expensive
and time consuming.
The subset of bots this method focuses on are those that can evade most, if not all current detection methods.
This is simply because they have little to no information associated with them that can be analyzed to make
a determination on whether they are a bot or not. While any account on Twitter has inherently has some
information associated with it, it is very easy to blend in with the masses of users who are simply “lurkers”,
those who only consume content but do not contribute. How can you determine if an account is a bot or not,
especially when they dont do anything? By the time they act, it’s too late to detect them. The only solution
would be a real-time, or near real-time, detection algorithm.
As stated in previous research, bots can influence public opinion [3,4,5,6,7], especially the reporting done in [7]
where the Syrian Intelligence Agency is alleged to have used Twitter and Twitter bots to attempt to shift public
opinion. This is certainly an extremely powerful tool, and as with most powerful tools, there is the possibility
that it will be used for malicious or less ethical purposes at some point.
While bot detection in general is a highly researched area, detecting large amounts of bots acting in unison
and/or in real-time is not. The few works that we could find take non a real-time approach, and rely on other
information such as URL analysis and network analysis [8,9].
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2. APPROACH
This approach, as most others, looks at analyzing simple attributes. The word simple is used not so much in
reference to the attribute, but the comparisons made upon them. While most researchers have utilized machine
learning algorithms such as neural networks and SVMs, the attributes used in this papers approach are analyzed
by performing a simple comparison to determine whether they are the same as that tweets neighbors attributes.
What makes it stand apart is not the attributes used, or even the specific combination, but rather that this
approach does not analyze the data, history, or network of an account. Instead, it compares most attributes
against the nearest N tweets as they appear in chronological order. This approach has both ups and downs. It
has the advantage of only requiring the data of N tweets to make a determination, as the only data considered
is that of the nearest N tweets on a chronological scale. As this approach is designed for detecting bot-nets
and spam campaigns, it will not detect a lone bot acting on its own. This approach has massive advantages by
requiring so little data that it is non-computationally difficult. This also allows this program to analyze tweets
in real-time.
The determination of whether a user is a bot or not is done by a scoring system. For each attribute below,
with the exception of entropy and sentiment, the score for each is on a scale of 0 to N , where N is the number
of neighboring tweets that are compared against. As there are 12 attributes, the maximum score is N ∗ 12 (with
the exception of multipliers). If a bot meets a certain percentage of this, they are classified as a bot.
• Text similarity
• For each similar text, how many were within N
units of time
• Summation of similarity score between current
tweet and N neighbors
• Language
• Gender
• User Agent
• Time zone
• Location
• Profile URL
• Profile description
• Entropy
• Sentiment
2.1 Thresholds
Not all of these attributes are Boolean comparisons of “are they the same?”, so we must have thresholds for
those attributes. Furthermore, not all thresholds or multipliers can be backed by statistical proof, as they are
inherently subjective. We can only try to justify our choice as best we can. Of course, no threshold or multiplier
is set in stone and each is easily configurable. They very well may need changing based on data source, or
dataset.
2.2 Text Similarity
For example, how similar to two pieces of text need to be to be considered similar?
String 1 String 2 Score
This is a test This is a test 1.0
abcd efgh 0.0
This is a test This is another test 0.83
(1) Please check out my awesome link! t.co/50938 (2) Please check out my awesome link! t.co/93452 0.916
How different do two strings have to be to be different? 0.392
Apples are good! #VoteForApple Oranges are bad! #VoteForApple 0.76
Apples are good! http://t.co/kjh3sf #VoteForApple 1 Oranges are bad! http://t.co/pl5ibq #VoteForApple 2 0.725
These two strings should be very different from each other. 0.103
Apples are good! http://t.co/kjh3sf #VoteForApple #ApplesRock 1 Oranges are bad! http://t.co/pl5ibq #VoteForApple #OrangesSuck 2 0.677
For this metric, a threshold of 0.6 - 0.65 seems ideal, and thus 0.6 was chosen in this effort.
2.3 Time Difference, Sentiment, Entropy
Time difference is the most subjective. A value of 4,000ms was chosen only based on that it should be large
enough to account for a bot master to send instructions to all, or most bots, such that most will act within this
time frame. As we analyze a sliding window based on a chronological scale, only some of them need to act at
any given time.
Standing on the shoulders of others, sentiment & entropy have already previously been shown to have a high
correlation with bots [10,11,12].
Both the sentiment and entropy metrics have been reproduced in our effort independently. Our results were
exactly in line with the works of others, which further re-enforces their validity.
2.4 Neighbors compared against
Counter-intuitively, the fewer neighbors compared, the higher the number of bots detected. However, if it’s too
low, then we give up some accuracy. Based off of the tables below, we chose N to be 20. Also, as N grows, so
does the time taken to analyze. Fortunately, a low N is desired which helps make this algorithm fast.
This work (and all work in this effort) was done on a machine with a consumer grade Intel Core i7 3770k.
This particular example was on a data-set that contained approximately 10,000 tweets.
# of neighbors compared Tweets per second(analyzed) Time taken Bots detected
10 65.6556 2m 31s 130
20 34.3044 4m 49s 125
30 24.299 6m 48s 119
40 23.4761 7m 52s 115
50 18.6037 9m 42s 111
This analysis was performed on several data-sets to determine the best value of N. For the sake of brevity,
only this partial table is included. In all cases, as N grows, bots detected will start to fall dramatically. In
this data-set, when N=100, only 45 bots were detected. However, in all cases, when N=10, although more were
detected, it included some false positives. For this reason, N is chosen to be 20.
2.5 High score
To choose a high score threshold, we analyzed the scores of multiple data-sets. As expected, only a small
percentage have an abnormal high score, but it’s clear that this spike is where the bots are.
All data-sets looked similar to this graph, but varied on at what percentage the spike occurred. All data-sets
fell within a window of 0.18-0.32.
Figure 1: High Score Curve - Count vs High Score
To get a better feel for what our high score threshold should be, we can also look at the same data through
the lens of k-means clustering
Figure 2: K-Means clustering on high score - 250k tweets
Note that this graph is of 250k tweets on a chronological scale. We can see that the spikes comprise only a
small percentage of this, but this graph makes them clear.
The threshold certainly changes from data-set to data-set, but overall, 0.25 is a good middle ground. For
this reason, 0.25 is chosen as our threshold.
2.6 Multipliers
Not all attributes are equal. As shown by others [10,11,12,14,15,16] (and many more), some attributes have a
high correlation with an account being a bot, while other attributes are used for reinforcement.
Intuitively, if two tweets have similar, or the same text within the sliding comparison window on a chronolog-
ical scale (which typically covers only a few milliseconds), it is a very good indicator that those messages were
from a bot, and thus we give that individual score a higher multiplier.
Attribute Multiplier
Similarity 2
Sentiment 1.2
Entropy 1.2
Similarity Count 1.2
Location 1
Language 1
User Agent 1
Time Zone 1
Profile Description 1
Profile URL 1
Time Difference 1
Gender 1
2.7 Example Scoring
To better illustrate how this method works, below will detail an example walk through of how a tweet’s bot score
is calculated.
In the neighboring 20 tweets... (N = 20)
Attribute Score
How many have text similarity greater than similarity threshold? 17
- For each of the above, how many were within 4 seconds? 14
Summation of similarity between tweets in window? 14.9582
Same language 15
Same Gender 7
Same User Agent 16
Same Time Zone 8
Same Location 0
Same profile URL 17
Same profile description 16
Is entropy lower than entropy threshold? Yes
Is sentiment higher than sentiment threshold? No
Now we take those scores, and add them all up while respecting multipliers.
Score = (17 * 2) + 14 + (14.9582 * 1.2) + 15 + 7 + 16 + 8 + 0 + 17 + 16 + (20 * 1.2) + 0 = 168.94984
Then we calculate the highest possible score
Total Possible Score = (20 * 2) + ((20*1.2) * 3) + (20 * 8)
= 272
Tweet’s score as a percentage = 168.94984/272
= 0.621
Lastly, we compare that to our high score threshold of 0.25. Since 0.621 is greater than 0.25, this tweet would
be labeled as coming from a bot that’s part of a bot-net.
In this example, we can see that 17 tweets in the sliding window of 20 tweets were above the similarity
threshold, which is a strong indicator of bot activity. It’s possible that these are re-tweets, or it may be the case
that many people are tweeting the same thing for whatever reason.
We also see that the summation of the similarity scores between the target tweet and it’s neighbors is 14.9582.
This is very high compared to the 17 tweets that were above the similarity threshold. If it was 17, that would
indicate that all 17 tweets were exactly the same. Since this is a little lower, this would indicate that the bots
messages were either randomized to some degree (bots often use an increment number - either as an Arabic
numeral, or spelled out) or the messages included a link, which Twitter automatically assigns a unique shortened
URL to.
Furthermore, we see that these likely bots all have the same profile URL and profile description, which is
common with bots who are trying to spam malicious links.
Lastly, and one of the strongest parts of this method, is that no single attribute will make a determination.
We see that 0 locations were the same within these tweets. This likely means that location reporting was turned
off, which is often the case.
3. DATA
Some of the data-sets used are detailed below.
Name Number of Tweets Period
20k 13,204 26m 43s
1k 1,000 51s
jadine 1,832 13h 50m 27s
isis 11,038 22m 22s
politics 250k 249,999 4h 45m 15s
red4tum 3,536 25m 1s
sample1 52,741 18m 59s
superbowl1 13,840 33m 56s
superbowllive 59,804 5m 15s
2 clean 25k 25,000 29m 11s
ny primary 250k 1 248,618 3h 46m 21s
ny primary 250k 2 248,497 3h 47m 36s
snl 4,113 32m 9s
We chose and collected data-sets to cover several scenarios. Some data-sets are filtered, some aren’t. Some
were collected over a year apart. Some were filtered by language, some weren’t. All data is as it came from
Twitter’s streaming API endpoint, which has tweets in chronological scale. The only modifications to these
data-sets was only to remove any bad or malformed tweets, which was only a negligible amount, if any at all per
data-set.
4. RESULTS
The below graph is an example of what an organic network looks like. This is included for reference, and as an
example of a ground truth for comparison against the network analysis of bot-nets. We can see that there are
many distinct groups, some large, some small, some interconnected, some aren’t.
Figure 3: Post analysis of a bot’s friends/followers
Below is a network graph of a detected bot-net. As can be seen, it is one large inter-connected group, where
everyone is ’friends’ with everyone else, which is highly unusually in an organic network.
Figure 4: Post analysis of a bot-nets network
5. CONCLUSION
Standing on the shoulders of others, we’ve shown an approach to detect bot-net spamming campaigns, that is
also effective, quick, and can be performed in real-time.
We detected 14,585 bots out of an analyzed 920,008 tweets. Just under 11,000 of these were unique accounts.
At the time of this writing, 2,586 of these accounts have been suspended or deleted, which further re-enforces
our work. However, it also shows that Twitter is behind on detecting this particular type of bot.
The time coverage for all data-sets collected is 1 day, 5 hours, 33 minutes, and 55 seconds. It took only 5
hours and 45 minutes to analyze this data. Our method was able to analyze data over five times faster than it
could be collected. However, none of our data-sets were from Twitter’s Firehose stream (100% of all tweets),
and our approach would not work in real time with that amount of data. We’re confident that with optimization
(i.e. moving to a faster language like C, versus currently using Python), and using commercial grade high-end
hardware, our approach would come close, if not achieve in analyzing 100% of all tweets in real-time. A worst
case scenario would simply employ a distributed processing approach.
6. FUTURE WORK
There is much to be done with refinement. All multipliers need further research and analysis to determine the
best values. The thresholds also need further research into determine with statistical analysis (if possible) what
thresholds are ideal.
Also, the attributes used should be further researched. Are all attributes required? Can the same accuracy
be obtained with less attributes? Could we achieve higher accuracy with more? What’s the minimum amount
of attributes required to retain a high accuracy? For example, user agent analysis has been shown to be an
indicator of an account being a bot, but this was not something explored in this effort [13].
No optimization were made to our approach, and should certainly be looked into. While this method is quite
fast, even using a slow language (Python) on a consumer grade, single PC, it could be much faster.
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